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INTRODUCTION
In addition to sharing defendant status in the most recognizable
mass-tort litigations in the United States, tobacco and asbestos compa-
nies have themselves been erstwhile adverse litigants. The fray be-
tween asbestos and tobacco companies arose from the former's
industry's efforts to defray its ever burdensome liability load.' One
can trace the first volleys between these two industries to asbestos de-
fendants' attempts to attain apportionment of damages in actions in-
volving smoker-plaintiffs who are claiming asbestos-related injuries.
Although tobacco companies are not parties in these cases, asbestos
defendants argue that plaintiffs' tobacco use triggers an offset of liabil-
ity under the doctrine of comparative negligence. 2
In 1997, riding the wave of third-party civil actions that health-
care insurers brought against the tobacco industry under the Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),- certain as-
bestos defendants brought their own contribution claims against the
tobacco industry. This Note discusses the import of one of these ac-
tions, Falise v. American Tobacco Co., which was adjudicated before
Judge Weinstein in the Eastern District of New York.4
I See discussion infra Part I.A.
2 See discussion infra Part I.B.
3 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified .as amended at 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1962-1968 (2002)).
4 Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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Many courts consider Falise to be a doctrinal outlier and criticize
it for being at odds with precedent concerning proximate cause in
RICO actions.5 Indeed, the ultimate outcome of Falise-a mistrial-
and the subsequent withdrawal of similar suits in other jurisdictions"
suggest that it is not only a liminal case, but also moot. This Note
argues, however, that in light of (1) the asbestos litigation crisis, 7 (2)
ample evidence concerning the synergistic effects between smoking
and asbestos exposure," and (3) the ineffectiveness of traditional con-
tribution and apportionment regimes as applied to asbestos defend-
ants, Judge Weinstein's analysis is rightly-minded and, at the very least,
illustrates the need for better contribution mechanisms to address as-
bestos defendants' liability dilemma.
Part I of this Note summarizes the state of the asbestos litigation
and the asbestos defendants' attempts to relieve their overwhelming
liability burden. Part II discusses the background of Falise, including
its facts, the general claims alleged, and the outcome. Part III dissects
the Falise court's analysis and distinguishes it from other RICO third-
party actions. It also proffers (1) rationales for better contribution
devices as well as (2) justifications of the Falise court's use of RICO.
Part IV concludes that Falise is distinguishable from other RICO con-
tribution claims against tobacco companies. Tort defendants who
find themselves in a similar predicament as the asbestos defendants
need relief mechanisms, and RICO provides an innovative solution to
the apportionment and contribution issue.
5 See, e.g., E. States Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 729 N.Y.S.2d 240,
248-49 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (refusing to follow Judge Weinstein's decisions in Blue Cross
& Blue Shield (4'NezJerso,, Inc. v. Philip Moris, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 221 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) and
noting that one court has criticized the opinion as a "'thinly disguised refusal to accept
and follow the Second Circuit's holding'" in Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit lund v. Philip
Moriis, Inc., 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1080 (2000), in which the
Second Circuit dismissed a health fund's third-party contribution claim against tobacco
companies for remoteness (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare
Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 196 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 1999))); see also Asbestos Products
Company Abandons Lawsuit Against Tobacco Companies; Similar Case Dismissed in Mississippi,
Bus. WIRE, July 27, 2001, WESTLAW, AllNewsPlus File [hereinafter Asbestos Products] (quot-
ing Philip Morris Associate General Counsel William S. Ohlemeyer as stating that "[c]ourts
across the country have consistently dismissed similar reimbursement cases because the
connection between the conduct at issue and the damages being claimed is indirect, re-
mote and speculative").
(' See Asbestos Products, supra note 5.
7 See discussion infra Part L.A (discussing increasing number of bankruptcies among
traditional and even non-traditional asbestos defendants).
8 See discussion infra Part l.B.
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I
THE CURRENT STATE OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION
A. Asbestos Defendants' Search for Litigation Relief
The year 2001 brought with it two more companies, Federal-Mo-
gul and USG Corp., filing for bankruptcy to shield themselves from
asbestos lawsuits.2' These companies joined the approximately thirty
companies"' that have filed for bankruptcy and reorganization in the
form of a trust to settle asbestos claims since Johns-Manville filed the
first Chapter 11 petition on August 26, 1982.1'
Over the years, as the impact and breadth of asbestos litigation in
the United States has escalated at an expedited pace,' 2 asbestos manu-
facturers and peripheral defendants have explored various avenues in
addition to bankruptcy to reduce liability exposure. " For example, to
alleviate case management and administrative costs, asbestos manufac-
turers, in coordination with certain plaintiffs' attorneys, have at-
tempted to attain class certification for asbestos plaintiffs and a
subsequent class settlement.14 In addition, given the large number of
claimants who were exposed to asbestos in naval shipyards, asbestos
defendants have brought suit against the U.S. government for contri-
bution. 15 Most recently, some asbestos defendants have even filed a
RICO conspiracy claim against certain asbestos plaintiffs' attorneys,
alleging strong-arm settlement tactics and conspiracy to inundate de-
fendants with meritless claims.'6 Over the past twenty years, asbestos
defendants have also lobbied extensively for legislative action to ad-
9 See Sandra Guy, USG Files Bankruptcy, CH]. SUN-TIMFS, June 26, 2001, at 45; Rhoda
Miel, Lawsuits Push Federal-Mogul to Chapter / 1, PLAsTics NEWS, Oct. 8, 2001, at 22.
o See Miel, supra note 9.
I See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MIS(.ONDNu F: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 3
(1985).
12 When Johns-Manville petitioned for Chapter 1l protection in 1982, the company
estimated that claimants would name it as a defendant "in at least 52,000 asbestos-disease
lawsuits before the litigation ran its course." Id. Nineteen years later, however, at the date
of its Chapter 1 I filing, claimants have named USG in over 250,000 asbestos suits and its
personal injury costs per year exceeded $275,000,000. See Guy, supra note 9.
13 The asbestos litigation has also generated a substantial anount of peripheral insur-
ance coverage litigation between asbestos manufacturers and their insurers, as well as be-
tween insurers and their reinsurers. See, e.g., hi re Liquidation of Midland hIs. Co., 269
A.D.2d 50 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); Fibreboard Corp. v. Hartford Accidefnt & Indem. Co., 20
Cal. Rptr. 2d 376 (Ct. App. 1993).
14 SeeAmchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597-601 (1997).
15 See UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 911 F.2d 654 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Keene Corp. v.
United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 146 (1989);Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 1 (Cl.
Ct. 1987).
16 In G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Baron & Budd, the plaintiff G-I Holdings, Inc., brought a
RICO suit against the asbestos plaintiffs bar (Baron & Budd, Weitz & Luxenberg, and Ness,
Motley). The Southern District of New York, however, granted summary judgment as to
the RICO claim. See 179 F. Supp. 2d 233, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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dress the asbestos litigation morass. 17 These maneuvers to defray costs
and liability and to preclude resort to bankruptcy protection have
proven futile.'
Another tactic that asbestos defendants have recently explored to
obtain relief from their daunting liability load is to seek a contribution
from a sister mass-tort litigant-the tobacco industry.
B. Tobacco and Asbestos: Joint Tortfeasors and Adverse
Litigants
The tobacco and asbestos industries have both figuratively and
literally met on numerous occasions in the courtroom. Asbestos de-
fendants raise the issue of a particular plaintiffs smoking habit in
their defense strategies under two rubrics: (1) tobacco use by a claim-
ant as a basis for apportionment of liability in the original action; and
(2) contribution from the tobacco industry in a separate action claim-
ing the tobacco industry as a nonparty tortfeasor. The latter rubric is
the direct focus of this Note; however, it is useful to explicate the ap-
portionment strategy, which is also a contribution strategy.
1. Apportionment Claims in the Original Action
Asbestos exposure is known to cause asbestosis, malignant
mesothelioma, lung cancer, and pleural plaques.19 These are all pro-
gressive and incurable ailments. 2 1 Whereas one can attribute asbesto-
sis, mesothelioma, and pleural plaques solely to asbestos exposure,2'
doctors most commonly attribute lung cancer to smoking.22 A signifi-.
cant number of claims against asbestos defendants have involved
smokers arguing that asbestos exposure caused their lung cancer.23
Furthermore, since the 1980s, a growing consensus within the medical
community is that there is a distinct relationship between tobacco use
17 Legislators have proposed no less than ten distinct reforms. See Guy, supra note 9.
18 See generally G. Marcus Cole, A Calculus Without Consent: Mass Tort Bankruptcies, Fu-
ture Claimants, and the Problem of Third Party Non-Debtor "Dischaige", 84 IOWA L. REV. 753
(1999) (explaining why third-party non-debtor discharges have not succeeded with credi-
tors or courts and arguing that bankruptcy courts should lack jurisdiction to negate such
releases).
19 See Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); sources
cited infra note 24.
20 See sources cited infra notes 24-25.
21 See sources cited infra note 24.
22 See Lungs and Bronchus: U.S. Racial / Ethnic Cancer Patterns, at http://www.cancer.
gov/statistics/cancertype/lung-racial-ethnic (last visited Apr. 7, 2003) (finding that
"[c]igarette smoking accounts for nearly 90% of all lung cancers"); se generally U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SMOKING AND HEAuri: A NATIONAL STATUS REPORT, Pub.
No. 87-8396 (1990), http://sgreports.nlm.nih.gov/nn/b/b/v/p/-/nnbvp.pdf.
23 See, e.g., Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997).
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and asbestos exposure 24-i.e., that "the risk of harm from exposure to
both carcinogens is greater than the sum of the risk from exposure to
the individual carcinogens. '25 Applying this synergy concept, asbestos
defendants have attempted to seek apportionment in cases involving
smoker-plaintiffs. 2
6
In these synergy cases, asbestos defendants have pursued two
strategies based on causation and apportionment theories. First, the
defendants argue that asbestos exposure did not cause the claimant's
lung cancer. 27 Second, they opine alternatively that, even assuming
that asbestos was a causal factor, the asbestos defendants are entitled
to apportionment from tobacco companies of their liability as offset
by the percentage of fault that a fact-finder attributes to the plaintiffs
tobacco use. 28
For two reasons, asbestos defendants have been, for the most
part, unsuccessful with both of these strategies. First, despite the exis-
tence of research that validates the synergy between asbestos exposure
and smoking, courts have been reluctant to allow juries to apportion
liability because such apportionment would be too speculative. 29 In-
terestingly, one might assume that courts in states with comparative
negligence regimes would at least entertain the apportionment argu-
ment, as the "underlying philosophy [of comparative negligence is
that] each wrongdoer should pay for his or her own fault.' ' 31 Yet, in
cases in which asbestos defendants have implicated tobacco as contrib-
uting to a plaintiff's injury, such courts have precluded
apportionment. 3'
The second barrier to the quest for apportionment is that some
states have immunized the tobacco industry from direct liability for
their products. For example, California has enacted such immunizing
24 See Council on Scientific Affairs, A Physician's Guide to Asbestos-Related Diseases, 252
JAMA 2593, 2593-96 (1984); PhilipJ. Landrigan, The Recognition and Control of Occupational
Disease, 266 JAMA 676 (1991).
25 Altiere v. Fibreboard Corp., 617 A.2d 1302, 1305 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (citing Ar-
nold E. Reif, Synergism in Carcinogenesis, 73J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 25 (1984)).
26 See, e.g., Taylor v. Celotex Corp., 574 A.2d 1084 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (affirming
trial court's denial of apportionment instruction in case in which plaintiff-smoker exposed
to asbestos suffered from asbestosis).
27 See Borman v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 960 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting de-
fense expert's testimony that asbestos exposure did not cause plaintiffs lung cancer).
28 See id.
29 Martin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 528 A.2d 947, 950 (Pa. 1987) (holding
that a "'[r]ough approximation' [in apportionment] is no substitute for justice" (citation
omitted)).
30 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.2 (3d ed. 1994).
31 See cases cited supra notes 26-29. But see Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp., 418 N.W.2d
650, 654-55 (Mich. 1988) (affirming a jury's apportionment of 55% fault to the plaintiff
for his own "negligence" from smoking).
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legislation;32 thus, in cases in which asbestos defendants seek appor-
tionment credit for a plaintiff's tobacco use under California's appor-
tionment and comparative fault statute, 3- California courts refuse the
request because the nonparty tobacco defendant is not a "tortfeasor."
The courts reason that because legislation precludes liability against
tobacco manufacturers on direct claims, courts may not hold the to-
bacco industry even nominally liable under the apportionment
doctrine.34
2. Separate Contribution Claims
Asbestos companies have also attempted to obtain contribution
from the tobacco industry in separate contribution actions. As noted
above, in comparative fault jurisdictions, ajury may take into account
the conduct of nonparties to a litigation when apportioning liability in
the original action or in a separate contribution action. 3 All jurisdic-
tions, including those adopting a form of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA),346 impose time limits for contribu-
tion actions, usually one to two years following the underlying claim of
personal injury liability. 7
Statutes of limitations, however, are not the precluding factor
that prevents asbestos defendants from pursuing separate contribu-
tion actions. Simply put, asbestos defendants would not prevail on
such actions for many of the same reasons that they do not succeed
under the apportionment theory in the original actions. 8 First, in
jurisdictions that have immunized the tobacco industry fron direct
liability, a contribution claim fails as a matter of law. Second, some
comparative negligence states that do not follow the UCATA bar sepa-
rate contribution actions against nonparties." ' Third, tobacco compa-
'32 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.45 (West 1998) (affording immunity to suppliers of certain
unhealthy products, such as tobacco); see Stephen D. Sugarman, Tobacco Tort Litigation in
California: A Better Understanding of Civil Code Section 1714.45, 38 SAN DI E;o L. REV. 1051
(2001) .
3'4 CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1431-1431.5 (West Supp. 2003).
"44 See Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1225 (Cal. 1997); Richards v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 928 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Cal. 1997).
35 AMERICAN LAw OF PRODucTs LIABILITn § 52:27 (Timothy E. Travers et al. eds., 3d
ed. 1987) WrL ALPL § 52:27 ("a number of jurisdictions require the trier of fact to consider
the fault of all persons who contributed to the alleged injury.").
316 See id. § 57:31 (discussing the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act).
37 See id. § 52:87 (discussing limitations period in actions for contribution).
-38 See supra Part I.B.I.
39 See, e.g., St. Mary's Hosp. v. Health Personnel Options Corp., 72 N.E.2d 1213 (111.
App. Ct. 1999) (holding that a separate contribution action against a nonparty was pre-
cluded for failure to join in original action); Casa Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 951 S.W.2d
865 (Tex. App. 1997) (upholding summary judgment against a defendant seeking a post-
judgment contribution claim against a party that the plaintiff did not name in the original
action); Howell v. Luckey, 518 S.E.2d 873 (W. Va. 1999) (holding that a defendant cannot
bring a separate contribution claim against a nonparty to the original action and rejecting
1148 [Vol. 88:1142
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nies are not liable under direct strict liability doctrine: no jurisdiction
has imposed categorical liability for tobacco products. 41 Thus, plain-
tiffs seeking action against the tobacco industry must resort to failure-
to-warn, misrepresentation, and conspiracy theories. 41
The difficulty an asbestos company would confront in bringing a
claim under any of these theories is clear. Even if (1) the asbestos
defendant brings the separate contribution claim within the statute of
limitations, (2) the venue of the action is in a jurisdiction in which
plaintiffs may bring contribution actions against nonparties, and (3)
the state has not immunized the tobacco industry, what would consti-
tute the asbestos defendant's case? The case would require proof in
support of an unworkable theory-either failure-to-warn or misrepre-
sentation to the original plaintiff-that tobacco companies induced
her to start and continue smoking. Such a claim would involve pro-
tracted litigation, not about the asbestos defendant's case, but rather
about the original plaintiff's case. This obstacle is probably why asbes-
tos defendants have neither attempted conventional separate contri-
bution claims nor joined tobacco defendants in the original actions. 42
Apportionment in the original action and contribution in a sepa-
rate action would appear to offer relief to asbestos defendants, be-
cause there is substantial evidence regarding the synergy between
tobacco use and asbestos exposure. 43I These options, however, offer
few prospects for relief in light of tobacco's special status in tort and
the difficulties in proving causation. 44 Nonetheless, as discussed in
the following subpart, in the late 1990s another avenue for relief-in
addition to apportionment and contribution-arose for asbestos de-
fendants to shift a portion of their liability to the tobacco industry:
RICO.
C. RICO and the Funds Cases
Emboldened by the tobacco industries' multi-billion dollar settle-
ments with the states, 45 plaintiffs' attorneys representing various
the UCATA approach). But see Steve Spicer Motors, Inc. v. Gilliam, 19 S.W.3d 153 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding that the original plaintiff need not name the alleged tortfeasor in the
underlying action for that tortfeasor to be subject to contribution in a separate action).
40 SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liabil-
ity Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1317-18 (1991); see
also RESTATEIENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998) § 2 cmt. d ("[C]ourts
have not imposed liability for categories of products that are generally available, widely
used and consumed, even if they pose substantial risks of harm.").
41 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
42 See Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
43 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
44 See supra notes 27, 40 and accompanying text.
45 The landmark tobacco litigation brought by approximately forty states was provi-
sionally settled in June 1997. See FrankJ. Vandall, The Legal Theory and the Visionaries that
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health care insurance provider funds,4 1 occupational health trust
funds, 47 and hospitals48 began bringing third-party contribution
claims against the tobacco industry.49 The liability theory that the
Funds employed approximated the theory used by the states; namely,
they argue that the tobacco industry should pay a portion of the costs
the Funds incurred in treating tobacco-related illnesses. 5"
All of the Funds' actions invoked a mix of antitrust laws, RICO, or
state fraud causes of action as the bases for their claims.5' The Funds'
allegations fell into two categories: (1) indirect injury claims-that
over a period of forty years the tobacco industry suppressed the dan-
gers of tobacco use, thereby inducing the Funds' participants to
smoke, which in turn forced the Funds to pay for their treatment; and
(2) direct injury claims-that due to the tobacco industry's conspiracy
to suppress the dangers of cigarette smoking, the Funds did not estab-
lish counseling programs to help their participants quit smoking.52
Almost all of the courts that addressed these claims disposed of them
as a matter of law against the Funds plaintiffs. 5 3
A valid civil RICO claim can be distilled as follows: the defendant
has (1) violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (setting forth the "[p]rohibited activ-
Led to the Proposed $368.5 Billion Tobacco Settlement, 27 Sw. U. L. REv. 473, 478 (1998). The
innovative theory of liability rested on the idea that "the states should be able to sue in
order to recover the costs of treating disease .. caused by cigarette smoking." Id.
46 See Regence Blueshield v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 99-35203, 2001 WL 205996 (9th
Cir. Feb. 28, 2001); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 133 F.
Supp. 2d 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Philip Morris, Inc., 47 F.
Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Il. 1999).
47 Serv. Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 249 F.3d
1068 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Lyons v. Philip Morris, Inc., 225 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 2000); Tex.
Carpenters Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000); Labor-
ers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999); Or.
Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185 F.3d 957 (9th
Cir. 1999); Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d
912 (3d Cir. 1999); E. States Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 729 N.Y.S.2d 240
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); Steamfitters Local Union No. 614 Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., No. W1999-01061-COA-R9-CV, 2000 WL 1390171 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26,
2000).
48 See Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2000).
49 This Note refers to these entities collectively as "Funds."
50 See Vandall, supra note 45.
51 See cases cited supra notes 46-47.
52 See Allegheny Gen., 228 F.3d at 433-34.
53 See Serv. Employees, 249 F.3d at 1068; Regence Blueshield v. Philip Morris, Inc., No.
99-35203, 2001 WL 205996 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2001); Lyons, 225 F.3d at 909; Laborers Local
17,191 F.3d at 229; Steamfitters Local Union No. 420, 171 F.3d at 912; Ark. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v. Philip Morris, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Il. 1999); Steamfitters Local Union No.
614, 2000 WL 1390171; E. States, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 240. But see Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (rejecting a motion for
summary judgment); Serv. Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 1999), rev'd, Serv. Employees, 249 F.3d at 1068 (same).
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ities" which trigger a civil RICO claim); 54 and (2) "by reason of' hav-
ing violated § 1962, the defendant has caused the plaintiff to suffer an
injury to her "business or property."55 The Supreme Court in Holmes
v. Securities Investor Protection Corp. construed the "by reason of' lan-
guage in § 1964 as requiring either cause-in-fact or but-for cause. 56
The Holmes Court stated that, although not explicit in the language of
§ 1964, a civil RICO plaintiff must also establish proximate cause in
the common-law sense.57 It is this proximate cause hurdle that has
hampered the Funds' RICO claims.
Courts that have passed on the Funds cases have uniformly relied
on insufficient proof of proximate cause as the basis for dismissing the
claims. 58 Invoking the proximate cause standard for RICO claimants,
as set forth in Holmes, lower courts have held that the damages sought
by the Funds as third parties against the tobacco industry are too re-
mote and speculative. 59 Of the ten third-party contribution actions
brought against the tobacco industry by the Funds, only two survived
summary judgment at the trial level.61 Consequently, it appeared that
the tobacco industry had laid to rest this type of third-party contribu-
tion claim. 61 Third-party contribution claims against the tobacco in-
dustry, however, were not all dead-at least not yet. On November 11,
1999, in Falise v. American Tobacco Co., the Johns-Manville Trust filed a
54 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(a)-(d) (2002). This section requires that the conduct, or
rather the predicate acts, constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity." Id. § 1962(a). A
"'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two" predicate acts. Id. § 1961 (5).
55 Id. § 1964(c). For a general discussion of RICO elements and commentary, see
ARTHUR F. MATHEWS ET AL., CIVIL RICO LITIGATION (2d ed. 1992); Roger T. Creager, A
Current Guide to Civil RICO in New York Federal Courts, 66 N.Y. ST. B.J. 18 (1994).
56 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
57 See id. at 268.
58 See, e.g., Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 443-46 (3d Cir.
2000).
59 A RICO plaintiffs claim fails "for being too remote and speculative" due to the
following proximate cause policy considerations: (1) the injury is too indirect-"the more
indirect the injury, 'the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiffs
damages .. .'; (2) allowing recovery by indirectly injured parties would require complicated
rules for apportioning damages; and (3) direct victims could generally be counted on to
vindicate the policies underlying the relevant law." Steamfitters Local Welfare Fund v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 932 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70).
This Note further explicates the Holmes articulation of proximate cause under RICO
in Part III. For a general discussion of RICO proximate cause, see Antonella M. Madonia,
Comment, Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.: Standing to Sue Under Section
1964(c) of RICO for the Securities Fraud Plaintiff 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 923 (1993) and Stephen
Scallan, Proximate Cause Under RICO, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 455 (1996).
60 The two actions that survived summaryjudgnent are Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) and Service Employees
International Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C.
1999), revd, 249 F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
61 For a discussion criticizing the courts' use of proximate cause to nullify third-party
claims under RICO by fund-type entities, see Stasia Mosesso, Note, Up in Smoke: How the
Proximate Cause Battle Extinguished the Tobacco War, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 257 (2000).
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third-party contribution claim under RICO against the American To-
bacco Company and other cigarette manufacturers. 62
II
CASE DIscussiON: FALISE v. AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY
A. The Falise Plaintiffs' Theories of Recovery
The plaintiffs in Falise were the trustees of the Johns-Manville
Trust (the "Trust"), a trust which was created in 1988 to cover the
outstanding asbestos liability of the bankrupt Johns-Manville Corpora-
tion. 63 The Trust brought a mixed civil RICO and state fraud action
against various tobacco defendants ("Tobacco"), seeking monetary
damages for their alleged contribution to the asbestos-related injuries
suffered by the Trust's claimants. 64 In essence, the action claimed
that the liabilities of the Trust were "substantially due to Tobacco's
alleged misconduct in suppressing and concealing material informa-
tion, and disseminating misinformation" concerning the risks posed
to those who both smoked and were exposed to asbestos.
65
Judge Weinstein catalogued the plaintiffs' theories of recovery as
follows: (1) a RICO settlement action claim alleging that Tobacco en-
gaged in conduct directed at the Trust that fraudulently misinformed
the Trust of the synergistic effects between smoking and asbestos ex-
posure in order to minimize the damages that Tobacco would owe to
smoker-asbestos claimants ("'RICO Settlement Action"); (2) a RICO
litigation action claim alleging that Tobacco devised a scheme to
fraudulently misinform the Trust, causing the Trust to forego the op-
tion to implead Tobacco as a co-defendant in asbestos-related litiga-
tions ("'RICO Litigation Action"'); (3) a RICO direct payment action
claim alleging that Tobacco engaged in conduct to fraudulently misin-
form asbestos workers to encourage them to continue to smoke and
not to quit, thereby increasing the number of claimants to whom the
Trust was liable (" 'RICO Direct Payment Action"'); (4) a RICO invest-
ment action alleging that Tobacco invested RICO-derived income to
fund a scheme to cause the Trust to bear greater payments than it
otherwise would have ("'RICO Investment Action"'); and (5) a state
fraud action alleging that Tobacco's fraudulent scheme caused more
serious asbestos-related injuries due to the synergy between smoking
and asbestos exposure, in violation of state common law ("'State
Fraud Action' ").66
62 See Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
63 Id.
64 See id.
65 Id. at 326.
66 See id. at 322-23.
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B. Relevant Evidence of Fraudulent Misinformation and Synergy
The Falise opinion referenced a wide array of state-of-the-art med-
ical literature illustrating the synergy between smoking and asbestos-
related injury, as well as Tobacco's very own documentation showing
the fraudulent concealment of such synergistic effects.67 The Trust's
medical evidence included articles and studies dating as far back as
the early 1970s, detailing the increased health risks caused by the
combination of tobacco use and asbestos exposure. 68 In addition, the
Trust cited more recent studies, including a 1996 study which found
the incidence of lung cancer to be fifty-three times greater for an as-
bestos-exposed smoker than for an unexposed non-smoker, and ten
times greater than for a non-smoker occupationally exposed to
asbestos.69
The complaint also referenced seemingly damning documentary
evidence of Tobacco's campaign of fraudulent misinformation con-
cerning the synergistic effects between smoking and asbestos expo-
sure.7° Specifically, it noted internal memoranda demonstrating
Tobacco's knowledge of the synergistic effects, 71 as well as Tobacco's
alleged cover-up of such knowledge. 72
Examples of evidence relating to Tobacco's knowledge of the syn-
ergy included a document that an attorney for American Tobacco
drafted in 1978 acknowledging that "'the risk [of lung cancer in] a
smoking asbestos worker is enormously inflated over that of a non-
smoking asbestos worker,'" 7 " and a 1968 Philip Morris memorandum
suggesting that "asbestos workers... should be discouraged from in-
dulging in the habit [of smoking] .74 Moreover, the complaint refer-
enced publications illustrating Tobacco's cover-up of its knowledge
and dissemination of misinformation. 75 For example, a 1979 article
published by the Tobacco Institute claimed that asbestos workers who
do not smoke faced an increased risk of cancer, 76 and a 1997 R.J.
67 See id. at 327-33.
68 See id. at 327 (citing G. Berry et al., Combined Effects of Asbestos Exposure and Smoking
on Mortality from Lung Cancer in Factory Workers, 2 LANCET 476, 478 (1972) (finding that the
risk fiom combined tobacco use and asbestos exposure was fifty times greater than that in
unexposed populations)).
69 See id. (citing Piero Mustacchi, Lung Cancer Latency and Asbestos Liability, 17J. LEGAL
MED. 277, 280-97 (1996) (study of 17,800 insulators and asbestos workers over a twenty-
year period)).
70 See id. at 328.
71 See id. (referencing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 46-47, 49).
72 See id. at 328-29 (referencing Plaintiffs Amended Complaint at 48, 50, 52).
73 Id. at 328 (reproducing Plaintiffs Amended Complaint at 46 (quoting Memoran-
dum fi-om Janet Brown, American Tobacco (Nov. 22, 1978))).
74 See id. (reproducing PlaintiWs Amended Complaint at 46 (quoting Memoran-
dum fiom H. Wakeham, Philip Morris (Aug. 7, 1968))).
75 See id. at 328-29.
76 See id.
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Reynolds article claimed that one could interpret the data concerning
the synergy between smoking and asbestos as smoking protecting the
smoker from occupational exposure to asbestos.7 7 The court's exten-
sive explication of this documentation in its opinion emphasizes its
importance to the ruling on Tobacco's motions for summary judg-
ment as to all of the Trust's claims.
C. Falise Analysis and Adjudication of the Plaintiffs' Claims on
Tobacco's Motion for Summary Judgment
The opening salvo in the Falise litigation was Tobacco's motion
for summary judgment as to all of the Trust's claims. Judge Weinstein
granted Tobacco's motions as to the Trust's RICO Settlement Action
and RICO Litigation Action, but the court permitted the Trust's RICO
Direct Payment Action 'to proceed to trial.78
1. Dismissal of RICO Settlement Action and RICO Litigation Action
Claims
Under its RICO Settlement Action and RICO Litigation Action
theories, brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)'s mail and wire
fraud prohibitions, the Trust alleged that it had relied to its detriment
on Tobacco's misinformation.79 In particular, the Trust pleaded that,
in reliance on the misrepresentation directed at it by Tobacco, the
Trust (1) forewent the opportunity to implead the tobacco defendants
in the original asbestos suits; (2) assumed Tobacco's share of the inju-
ries that the Trust's claimants suffered; and (3) settled claims that it
would not otherwise have settled."
Because the Trust's action alleged mail and wire fraud as the
predicate acts for RICO liability, the Trust was required to show justi-
fied reliance on Tobacco's fraud:81 "[J]ustified reliance on the [al-
leged] fraud is necessary to establish causation in fact."'8 2 In cases in
which, as here, the allegedly fraudulent scheme is directed at a large
segment of the population, the requirement is met if the reliance is
both detrimental and reasonable.8 3 Unfortunately for the Trust, its
depositions and responses to interrogatories supported the conclu-
77 See id. at 329 (referencing Plaintiff's Counterstatement on Direct Injury at 12).
78 Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 91 F. Supp. 2d 525, 527 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); see supra text
accompanying notes 61-62. The court also initially denied summary judgment with re-
spect to the plaintiff's RICO Investment Action and State Fraud Action. See Falise, 94 F.
Supp. 2d at 323. However, it subsequently granted the motion for the RICO Investment
Action. See id.
79 See Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 334.
82 [(.
8-" /d. at 334, 337.
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sion that the reason the Trust did not implead Tobacco in the original
personal injury actions was, in fact, that the Trust did not believe it
could ultimately prevail against Tobacco at trial.8 4 The Trust also con-
ceded that it had knowledge of the synergistic effects of asbestos expo-
sure and tobacco use as early as 1988.85 Such evidence, according to
the court, indicated that Tobacco did not mislead the Trust at all.8 6
Therefore, the Trust could not have detrimentally relied on To-
bacco's misinformation and misrepresentation.8 7 Due to the Trust's
lack of detrimental reliance on Tobacco's misrepresentations, the
court dismissed both the RICO Settlement and RICO Litigation
claims. 88
2. The RICO Direct Payment Action Survives Summary Judgment
and Proceeds to Trial
With respect to the RICO Direct Payment Action,89 the court
held that there was a "sufficient showing of detrimental reliance" to
satisfy RICO's but-for cause requirement.90 More importantly, unlike
other Funds cases, which failed to surmount the proximate cause ob-
stacle due to the indirect nature of the harm,9 1 the Trust in Falise suc-
ceeded in satisfying the proximate cause requirement as well. 92 Judge
Weinstein held that, although the Trust based its claim upon an indi-
rect injury, the Trust satisfied proximate cause.93
In order to reach this decision, the Falise court distinguished the
case at bar from the Second Circuit case most directly on point, Labor-
ers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,°4 and applied
Holmes's95 tripartite proximate cause policy factors. 96 Holmes expli-
cated the following three policy considerations for courts to weigh in
determining whether proximate cause limits an indirect, harm-based
84 Id. at 336.
85 See id. Indeed, the Trust admitted that "perhaps" by 1988 it had been aware of a
1985 Surgeon General report "indicat[ing] that the risk of lung cancer among asbestos
workers was five times higher than that for workers in other industries, [and] that said risk
is 50 times higher if the asbestos worker smokes." Id.
86 See id. at 337.
87 See id.
88 Id.
89 See supra text accompanying note 66.
90 Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
91 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
92 See Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 347. "'"The general tendency of the law, in regard to
damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step.""' Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp.,
503 U.S. 258, 271-72 (1992) (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534 (1983) (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer
Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533 (1918))).
93 Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 347.
94 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999).
95 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
96 See Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 340-47; infra Part III.A.3.
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RICO claim: (1) the difficulty in assessing damages if a jury attributes
a plaintiffs harm to independent factors; (2) the difficulty of appor-
tioning damages among different plaintiffs in order to "obviate the
risk of multiple recoveries"; and (3) the possibility of more directly
injured victims who could be "counted on to vindicate the law as pri-
vate attorneys general."9 7 Applying these criteria to Falise's facts,
Judge Weinstein held that intervening causes were minimal,98 that
there was no threat of difficulty in apportioning damages,"' and that
there were no other more direct victims who could more appropri-
ately bring a civil RICO action. 10 Consequently, Judge Weinstein per-
mitted the Trust to continue its RICO Direct Payment Action. 10
The Falise court's finding of sufficient proximate cause presents
the most controversial aspect of the decision.1 2 Part III parses in fur-
ther detail the proximate cause analysis in Falise in relation to Holmes
and Laborers Local 17.
D. Resolution of the Case
In January 2001, the Falise saga came to an abrupt, albeit bizarre,
end when the judge declared a mistrial."113 Subsequently, asbestos
manufacturers either withdrew similar cases brought in other jurisdic-
tions, or judges dismissed those complaints.10 4
III
ANAIYSIS
This Part argues that the Falise court's causation finding with re-
gard to the RICO Direct Payment claim is consistent with a broad
reading of the Supreme Court's Holmes causation test, even if the deci-
sion seems on its face to be inconsistent with existing Second Circuit
doctrine. It argues also that the court's decision to allow the contribu-
tion claim to proceed was correct for three reasons. First, one can
distinguish the Falise plaintiffs and facts from other fund-type contri-
bution actions. Second, countervailing policy considerations, such as
the fact that current contribution and apportionment systems and
97 See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70.
98 See Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 342-44.
99 See id. at 344-45.
100 See id. at 345-46.
101 See id. at 347. The court also allowed the Trust to proceed on its State Fraud Ac-
tion. See id. at 357.
102 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
103 Tom Hays, Tobacco-Asbestos Mistrial Declared, AP, Jan. 25, 2001 (noting that a juror
sent Judge Weinstein a hand-written note on the fifth day of deliberations reading "Juror
has made threat against otherjuror to kill if required to be here 'much longer"' and also
that the jury was deadlocked for the tobacco industry and that tensions were mounting
against the holdouts).
104 See Asbestos Products, supra note 5.
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mechanisms provide few remedies for mass toxic tort defendants, tip
the balance of proximate cause in favor of letting the claim proceed.
Third, given the unique and intertwined nature of the tobacco and
asbestos litigations, courts should establish contribution and appor-
tionment mechanisms for illnesses that juries can attribute to both
tobacco and asbestos. Allowing contribution through a RICO action
provides an innovative opportunity for courts to establish such
mechanisms.
A. The Falise Court Properly Found Sufficient But-For and
Proximate Causation
The Falise court's conclusion that the plaintiffs' RICO Direct Pay-
ment claim satisfies proximate cause appears to contradict both gen-
erally prevailing law,105 as well as the law of the Second Circuit.10 6 Not
surprisingly, some have accused Judge Weinstein of performing ana-
lytical acrobatics in order to sidestep the Second Circuit's holding in
Laborers Local 17 to arrive at a finding of sufficient proof of causa-
tion. 10 7 Regardless, the Falise court's analysis is sound. The following
subparts argue that the Second Circuit's re-articulation of Holmes
overly ossifies the Holmes conceptualization of proximate cause. Al-
though Falise may appear contrary to Laborers Local 17, the decision
squares with the Supreme Court's articulation of RICO causation in
Holmes.
It bears noting that the Falise court found sufficient proof of the
first prong of the causation analysis-but-for causation. To do so, the
court referred to the Harris Model, a statistical model prepared by the
Trust's expert that compared the quit rates of asbestos worker smok-
ers who had information concerning the synergistic effects of smoking
and asbestos exposure to those workers who lacked such informa-
tion.108 The court held that the study provided a sufficient basis, for
summaryjudgment purposes, to find that the asbestos worker smokers
detrimentally relied on Tobacco's misrepresentations and omissions
so as to establish but-for causation.'0 9 As the core civil RICO cases
involving third-party contribution are disposed under the second
105 See Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 443-45 (3d Cir.
2000); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 196 F.3d 818, 823-26 (7th Cir. 1999).
106 See Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229
(2d Cir. 1999).
107 See E. States Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 729 N.Y.S. 2d 240,
248-49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
108 See Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 337-38 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
109 See id. at 338.
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prong, proximate cause,I1 0 the subsequent analysis of Falise focuses
only on the proximate cause issue under RICO.
1. Causation in Civil RICO Under Holmes
The Supreme Court spoke for the first time on the issue of causa-
tion under civil RICO in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.' '
First, Holmes validated the requirement of but-for causation under 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c), stating that one could read the language in the stat-
ute "to mean that a plaintiff is injured 'by reason of' a RICO viola-
tion.., on showing that.., the defendant's violation was a 'but for'
cause of plaintiffs injury." 12 Second, in addition to but-for cause,
Holmes further imposed a proximate cause requirement. Although
§ 1964(c) does not explicitly articulate such a requirement, 1 3 the
Court, by analogizing civil RICO to antitrust statutes and the Clayton
Act, held that § 1964(c) also requires proof of proximate cause. 114
Initially, the Holmes Court articulated the proximate cause re-
quirement as one grounded in common-law traditions. The Court
opined that "we use 'proximate cause' to label generically the judicial
tools used to limit a person's responsibility for the consequences of
that person's own acts. At bottom, the notion of proximate cause re-
flects 'ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively pos-
sible and convenient. "115 Then, the Court focused its articulation of
proximate cause in terms of directness, to wit: "[A]mong the many
shapes [that proximate cause] took at common law was a demand for
some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious
conduct alleged."1" 6 Finally, the Court presented the three policy
considerations already analyzed in connection with the "directness" of
the relationship between the injury and the violation. 1' 7
110 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
111 503 U.S. 258 (1992). For a summary of the facts of Holmes, see Madonia, supra note
59, at 938-41.
112 Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1992) (citation
omitted).
1 1'5 Edward Brodsky, RICO and 'Indirect Injuries', N.Y. L.J, Mar. 8, 1995, at 3, 3 ("Justice
Souter, writing for the majority, imported the proximate cause requirement of § 4 of the
Clayton Act into RICO's § 1964-even though the statute contains no such stated
criteria.").
114 See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268. Analogizing § 1964(c) to the Clayton Act, Justice Sou-
ter, writing for the majority, explained: "Thus, we held that a plaintiff's right to sue ...
required a showing that the defendant's violation not only was a 'but for' cause of his
injury, but was the proximate cause as well. The reasoning applies just as readily to
§ 1964(c)." Id.
115 Id. at 268 (quoting PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAw OF TORTS § 41 (W. Page Keeton et
al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)).
116 Id. (citation omitted).
117 See supra Part II.C.2.
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Two observations are relevant here. First, the Court prefaced the
policy considerations relating to "directness" with the statement that
although it is a central element, "such directness of relationship is not
the sole requirement of... causation." 1 8 Second, as noted above, the
Court began its proximate cause discussion by referencing the com-
mon-law traditions and roots of proximate cause. 119 Bearing in mind
these observations, one can express the Holmes causation analysis for
civil RICO as a two-prong inquiry of but-for cause and proximate
cause. The latter prong of proximate cause considers traditional no-
tions of fairness as well as the above three policy considerations con-
cerning "directness."
2. Proximate Cause in Civil RICO Under Laborers Local 17: A
Narrow Reading of Directness
Seven years after Holmes, the Second Circuit addressed the issue
of proximate cause in the RICO third-party contribution case Laborers
Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.120 The plaintiffs
in Laborers Local 17 alleged that Tobacco conspired to deceive union
health funds as to the dangers of smoking in order to shift the health-
related costs of smoking to the plaintiffs. 121
The Laborers Local 17 court first distinguished between direct inju-
ries and indirect injuries by discussing the direct injury test-"whether
the damages a plaintiff sustains are derivative of an injury to a third
party."' 22 If there is such a derivative injury, "then the injury is indi-
rect; if not, it is direct."'123 The court, citing Holmes, justified its focus
on the import of "directness." 124 Specifically, the Laborers Local 17
court commenced its analysis by stating that "Holmes emphasized that
although the direct injury test 'is not the sole requirement of [proxi-
mate] causation, it has been one of its central elements'"; therefore,
"plead [ing] a direct injury is a key element for establishing proximate
causation .. . ."125 The court further illustrated its focus on the con-
cept of "directness" of injury by referring to the settled tort law con-
cept that plaintiffs who are obligated to pay the medical expenses of
another may not recover against the tortfeasor who caused the dam-
118 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269.
119 Id. at 268.
120 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999).
121 See id. at 232-33.
122 Id. at 238-39.
123 Id. at 239.
124 Id. at 235.
125 Id. (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992) and
citing Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 540 (1983)).
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age, because "their injuries are ... derive[d] wholly from the injuries
sustained by [a] third party," and thus are indirect. 12 6
The Second Circuit's logic implicitly narrows Holmes by under-
scoring "directness" as a dispositive measure. Pursuant to the Laborers
Local 17 approach, once a court determines the injury to be "deriva-
tive" or "indirect," there is no proximate cause.1 2 7 In applying the
direct injury test, the court concluded that the Plaintiffs' injuries
are entirely derivative of the harm suffered by plan participants as a
result of using tobacco products .... Being purely contingent on
harm to third parties, these injuries are indirect. Consequently, be-
cause defendants' alleged misconduct did not proximately cause
the injuries alleged, plaintiffs lack standing to bring RICO claims
against defendants. 128
After concluding that a "derivative" or "indirect" injury forecloses
proximate cause, the court then determined whether this was consis-
tent with Holmes's tripartite policy considerations.1 29 Not surprisingly,
the Laborers Local 17 court's application of the Holmes policy considera-
tions corresponded with its finding of no proximate cause. 130 The
Holmes considerations, as parsed by the Second Circuit, essentially
served as an after-the-fact formality. It bears noting, however, that the
Second Circuit did qualify its narrow application of directness by
stating:
[W]e follow the lead of the Holmes Court in making clear that, to
the extent our description of "indirect" or "derivative" injury might
seem to encompass cases where recovery by the plaintiff would not
run afoul of the policy concerns set forth [by the Holmes court], the
outer limits of the direct injury test are described more by those
concerns than by any bright-line, verbal definition. 13 1
Although this language is consistent with the Holmes court's flexible
articulation of proximate cause, the Second Circuit ostensibly applied
"directness" as a bright-line rule.1 32 That is, under Laborers Local 17,
determining that the harm pleaded is indirect or derivative appears to
be fatal in fact.
126 Id. at 237.
127 See id. at 239.
128 Id.
129 See id.
130 See id. at 239-41.
131 Id. at 239 n.4.
132 See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
1160 [Vol. 88:1142
FALISE V. AMERICAN TOBACCO
3. The Falise Court's Proximate Cause Analysis: Applying Holmes
and Laborers Local 17
In contrast to Laborers Local 17, but in accordance with a flexible
reading of Holmes, the Falise court did not treat "directness" as disposi-
tive. It conceded the indirect or derivative nature of the harm al-
leged-that Tobacco's misrepresentations led asbestos-exposed
smokers to continue smoking, thereby increasing the Trust's liabil-
ity.13 3 However, by focusing his analysis on the Holmes policy consider-
ations, Judge Weinstein concluded that the considerations favored a
finding of proximate cause. In other words, the Falise court con-
cluded that this particular case was just one of those cases that the
Laborers Local 17 court had alluded to, in which there is an indirect
harm that does "not run afoul of the policy concerns" set forth by
Holmes. 13 4
a. Holmes Policy Concern No. 1: Difficulty of Assessing Damages
Due to Intervening Causal Factors
With respect to the first Holmes policy concern-the difficulty of
assessing damages in cases in which there are independent causal fac-
tors-Judge Weinstein distinguished Falise based on several factors
that diminished the speculativeness of assessing damages, notwith-
standing intervening causal elements.13 5 The Laborers Local 17 court
cited three possible intervening causes-that is, other reasons why the
third-party plaintiffs incurred harm-as further evidence of the diffi-
culty of assessing damages: 136
(1) the effect any smoking cessation programs or incentives would
have had on the number of smokers among the plan beneficiaries;
(2) the countereffect that . . . [Tobacco's] . . . direct fraud would
have had on the smokers ... ; and (3) other reasons why individual
smokers would continue smoking, even after having been informed
of the dangers .... 137
Addressing the intervening factor of individual smoker agency,
Judge Weinstein distinguished Falise on the evidence pled. The court
133 See Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[A] plain-
tiff may allege that 'his injuries were indirectly but proximately caused by a fraudulent
scheme directed at third parties .... ' (citation omitted)).
134 Id. at 341 (emphasis in original) (quoting Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 239 n.4 (2d Cir. 1999)).
135 See id. at 342-43.
136 The Laborers Local 17 court referenced the first Holmes policy consideration, which
concerned the difficulty of determining damages due to potential intervening causes:
"'First, the less direct an injury.., the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of
a plaintiff's damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent, fac-
tors."' Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 239 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Corp., 503 U.S.
258, 269 (1992)).
137 Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 343 (quoting Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 239-40).
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posited that elements absent from the other Funds cases diminished
the speculativeness of the damage assessment caused by the interven-
ing agency of individual smokers who decide whether and how fre-
quently to smoke.'3 8 In this regard, Judge Weinstein referred to the
statistical evidence of increased risks of harm to asbestos-workers who
smoke:
Asbestos-workers faced a relative risk of developing lung cancer
which was some 500% greater than that faced by the smokers in the
general population who were not occupationally exposed to asbes-
tos. Presented with these figures, it is difficult... to find that the
"other reasons" suggested in Laborers Local 17 would, in any mean-
ingful sense, lead asbestos-workers to continue smoking.1 39
Hence, had this information concerning the heightened risk of harm
attendant to smokers occupationally exposed to asbestos been availa-
ble, it would be reasonable to assume such persons would have ceased
to smoke.
More importantly, the Falise court pointed to another statistical
study the Trust presented in this case-the Harris Model. 14° This
study, which an expert for the Trust prepared, proffers a comparative
analysis of quit rates for asbestos-workers who "unlike the Trust's
claimants, were informed ... of the smoking-asbestos synergy and its
effects on human health."14 1 Accordingly, the court concluded that
such a study would afford "the jury ... a real world guide to measure
the effect of Tobacco's alleged misrepresentations and omissions."142
The Falise court cited the Harris Model as diminishing both the specu-
lativeness of the first Laborers Local 17 intervening factor (assessing the'
effect on the Trust's claimants had the Trust and its claimants been
privy to the synergistic effects) as well as the third factor of intervening
smoker agency. 143
Arguably, it is improbable that asbestos workers would have quit
smoking had this data been made available to them; however, it is
nonetheless plausible that some may have sought different employ-
ment. Recall that the Holmes analysis requires a court only to deter-
mine the level of difficulty in assessing damages. 144 Indeed, under the
Holmes policy consideration analysis, a court assesses the difficulty of
apportioning damages in cases in which (1) the harm may be attribu-
table to independent factors, and (2) there is a risk of multiple recov-
138 See id. at 342-44.
139 Id. at 344 (emphasis omitted).
140 See id. at 343-44.
141 Id. at 344.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 343-44.
144 See supra Part II.C.2.
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eries. 145 As the Falise court stated, this difficulty is tempered by the
availability of a benchmark-the statistical model itself, and the com-
parative statistical evidence of quit rates. 146 Furthermore, recall the
procedural posture of the case: it was on summary judgment. 14 7 In
light of the procedural posture, the court rightly credited the statisti-
cal model in favor of the Trust. Not only did the Harris Model pre-
sent a touchstone for the jury to assess the damages (thereby
diminishing the speculative nature of such damages), it also created a
question of fact as to the validity of the study. This is not a question a
judge should determine on a motion for summary judgment; rather, it
should be decided by a jury. 148
As the Falise court correctly noted, the second intervening cause
the Laborers Local 17 court cited-the countereffect of Tobacco's
fraud despite the best efforts of the Funds-was irrelevant in that the
Trust in Falise did not claim that, but for Tobacco's misrepresenta-
tions, it would have created cessation programs. 149 As an admitted
joint tortfeasor, the Trust merely alleged that Tobacco's direct fraud
increased the number of claimants seeking tort recovery from the
Trust. Therefore, the direct fraud countereffect concern did not
apply.
At bottom, the salient intervening factor that troubled the Sec-
ond Circuit in Laborers Local 17 was the individual agency of the smok-
ers. As this subsection has argued, the Harris Model sufficiently
tempered the speculative nature of assessing damages due to this in-
tervening causal element. 50
145 See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992).
146 See Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 343-44.
147 See supra Part II.C.
148 Under the summary judgment standard, the movant prevails by showing that
"'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.'" Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246,
251 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Moreover, "[i]n applying this stan-
dard ... [a court] 'resolve[s] all ambiguities, and credit[s] all factual inferences that could
rationally be drawn, in favor of the party opposing summary judgment."' Id. (emphasis added)
(quoting Cifra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ('The evidence of the non-movant is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.").
Of course, the tobacco defendants may have attacked the methodology and reliability
of the Harris Model under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, triggering a Daubert
question for the court. See Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 265-68
(2d Cir. 2002) (outlining the nature of a court's Daubert inquiry in determining the relia-
bility of expert witness testimony and evidence). However, given that the case proceeded
with the Trust's statistical evidence intact, it would appear that the Harris Model and testi-
mony survived any such Daubert scrutiny.
149 Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
150 See supra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
2003] 1163
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
b. Holmes Policy Concern No. 2: The Difficulty of Apportioning
Damages Among Different Plaintiffs to Prevent Double
Recovery
Addressing the second Holmes policy consideration-the problem
of double recovery-the Falise court found that the identity of the par-
ties significantly diminished this concern. As the Falise court correctly
reasoned, the identity of the parties distinguished Falise from the
Fund cases because Tobacco and the asbestos companies ("Asbestos")
were joint tortfeasors, as the Trust "[stood] in this litigation as an 'ad-
mitted tortfeasor.'" 1 5  This is an important fundamental characteris-
tic distinguishing Falise from other health and fund third-party
contribution RICO actions. Recall that the plaintiffs in the other
RICO third-party contribution suits against Tobacco were insurance
and health-fund entities who were never subject to tort liability arising
from the third-party claimants' injuries.' 52 Thus, there was no danger
of double recovery in those cases.
Consider a hypothetical asbestos worker who smokes and devel-
ops lung cancer. If this worker were to bring a suit against the Trust
to recover for her injury, then courts would preclude her from subse-
quently bringing suit for the same harm against Tobacco. It follows
that the defendant in this case, Tobacco, is not in danger of being
subjected to double recovery. As the Falise court rightly noted: "A vic-
tim of a tort caused by multiple tortfeasors does not obtain overlap-
ping recoveries."' 53  On the other hand, the danger of double
recovery was present in the Funds cases. The Funds' payment of med-
ical expenses to our hypothetical plaintiff would not preclude her
claim against Tobacco, thereby subjecting Tobacco to double recov-
ery. Given the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant in this case, the Falise court properly disposed of the sec-
ond Holmes policy consideration in favor of proximate cause.
c. Holmes Policy Concern No. 3: Existence of More Direct Victims
to Remedy the Violation
The Falise court's application of the third Holmes policy considera-
tion-the existence of more "directly injured victims" who could be
relied upon to "vindicate the law as private attorneys general"154-is
the most tenuous part of the opinion. The Holmes court implied that
151 Id. at 344.
152 See, e.g., Serv. Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
249 F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999); Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999).
153 Falve, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 344.
154 Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-70 (1992).
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"since directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindi-
cate the law as private attorneys general, without any of the problems
attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely,"' 55 courts
disfavor indirect plaintiffs. In Falise, the directly harmed parties were
the asbestos-smoker plaintiffs who claimed that Tobacco's misrepre-
sentations caused their injuries.1 56 It is clear that these plaintiffs
would be able to recover damages for their harms by bringing a direct
tort action against Tobacco. 57 Moreover, such recovery was possible
without the attendant difficulties intimated by the first and second
Holmes considerations. Facially, it would appear that this final Holmes
consideration cuts against a finding of proximate cause.
To address this issue, the Falise court first argued that because the
other policy considerations weighed in favor of a finding of proximate
cause, the court should discount the fact that more direct plaintiffs
existed. 158 Secondly, the court emphasized the outcome-efficiency of
allowing the Trust to litigate the matter: because eighty to ninety per-
cent of the Trust's claimants were smokers, recovery would immedi-
ately vindicate the directly injured parties. 159
In Holmes, the Supreme Court did not articulate a per se standard
on how lower courts should assess the tripartite policy considerations.
In light of the Holmes Court's silence on the matter, it was reasonable
for the Falise court to discount one consideration because the other
two suggest a finding of proximate cause. Furthermore, this balanc-
ing approach conforms to the flexible notions associated with proxi-
mate cause. 160 Recall that the Holmes Court grounded its analysis
upon a framework of common-law proximate cause, a concept whose
155 Id.
156 See Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 343-45. The court noted that the third Holmes fac-
tor "turns in substantial part upon whether Trust Claimants who smoked would be better
suited to remedy existing injuries caused by Tobacco's conduct." Id. at 345.
157 See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
158 See Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 345.
159 See id. at 345-46.
160 The two modern conceptualizations of proximate cause, the Harper and James
unreasonable foreseeable risk of harm articulation and the competing theory of Prosser
and Keeton (which couches proximate cause as a question of legal policy) inherently rec-
ognize the flexibility of the doctrine. See PatrickJ. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law:
History, Theory, and the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 52 (1991) ("Harper andJames
recognize that 'foreseeability' is an elastic concept.... Prosser and Keeton ... understand
proximate cause as 'the term ... applied by courts to those more or less undefined considera-
tions which limit liability even where the fact of causation is clearly established."' (citations
omitted) (emphasis added)). Ultimately, Kelley notes that although "[m]odern tort theo-
rists have lavished seemingly boundless attention on the problem of explaining proximate
cause ... the consensus of law students and others is that [it] remains a hopeless riddle."
1d. at 49-50; see also Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (noting
that "proximate cause ... depend[s] in each case upon many considerations").
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limits are defined by "'what justice demands. ' '" 61 Thus, no single
consideration should be dispositive in proximate cause analysis. 162
Another line of reasoning that supports the Falise court's determi-
nation-that it should discount the existence of more direct parties-
flows from the nature of this type of civil RICO action. It is clear that
the "more directly injured" parties in Falise, the smoker-plaintiffs ex-
posed to asbestos, did not have any legal right to bring individual
claims under RICO "because under the statute, personal injuries are
not recoverable." 63 Therefore, the argument that Asbestos lacked
standing or was too remote a party to vindicate the RICO claim
against Tobacco falls apart; even the more direct parties (the directly
injured smokers and Trust claimants) are precluded from bringing
such a claim. 1 64
Indeed, it is only logical that whenever a plaintiff pleads an indi-
rect harm, there will be a more direct plaintiff. The inquiry should
not end, as it does under Laborers Local 17, upon a showing that more
directly injured parties exist; a third-party contribution action, by defi-
nition, presumes that more directly harmed persons exist. Rather, the
third policy consideration in Holmes compels courts to inquire into
whether the directly injured plaintiff is better suited to litigate the
claim. As the Falise court explicated, and as argued above, the Trust
was not only the more appropriate plaintiff, but also the only plaintiff
to vindicate the harm. Moreover, even though the directly injured
plaintiffs could theoretically bring individual actions against Tobacco,
in practice they do not.165 Strategically, a smoker exposed to asbestos
is more likely to seek reparations solely from Asbestos, 166 thereby for-
ever absolving Tobacco of liability.
Lastly, the fact that the adjudication of the civil RICO claim
would also address the injuries of future claimants further buttresses
the rationale that the Trust is the better situated plaintiff. That is, the
damages that the Trust obtains from Tobacco would also be available
to plaintiffs whose harms have yet to materialize. Although the Trust's
current claimants may have common-law tort claims against Tobacco,
the future claimants do not.
4. Falise Proximate Cause Analysis Summary
As this Part has shown thus far, the Falise proximate cause analysis
fits soundly within the Holmes framework. There was both sufficient
161 Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (citation omitted).
162 See Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 103.
163 Mosesso, supra note 61, at 338 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
164 Id.
165 See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
166 See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
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but-for and proximate causation. On its facts, Falise presented ele-
ments which overcame the three Holmes policy considerations. Yet, in
light of the dispositions of other circuit and district courts that have
addressed third-party contribution claims under civil RICO, and in
particular the Second Circuit's narrow application of the direct injury
test, it would be naive to propose that the Trust's Direct Payment Ac-
tion could have survived an appeal. As expressed above, the vast ma-
jority of third-party claims involving hospitals, insurers, and health
funds seeking contribution from Tobacco illustrates that a majority of
courts are reluctant to hold that such plaintiffs have sufficient stand-
ing under the Holmes standard. 167 Had Tobacco appealed the Falise
court's recognition of standing, it is probable that the appellate court
would have overturned it as a misapplication of the Laborers Local 17
and Holmes RICO proximate cause analyses.
That said, the inquiry does not end here. The following subpart
argues that for policy reasons, the outcome of Falise-namely, the fact
that the court allowed the claim.,to proceed-was correct. This is so
because (1) Falise differs fundamentally from other RICO third-party
contribution actions; (2) policy considerations, such as the failure of
existing contribution mechanisms, favor a finding of proximate cause;
(3) the special relationship and problems that both the tobacco and
asbestos mass tort litigations pose warrant the creation of some system
of contribution between the two for harms attributable to both toxins;
and (4) the use of a RICO action in this regard would be an innova-
tive alternative contribution vehicle.
B. Public Policy and Equity Considerations Militate in Favor of
Allowing the Contribution Claim to Proceed
The fundamental element that distinguishes Falise from other
health and fund third-party contribution RICO actions is the identity
of the third-party plaintiffs. In Falise, the plaintiffs were admitted
tortfeasors who in turn sought recovery from Tobacco entities as joint
167 See Regence Blueshield v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 99-35203, 2001 WL 205996 (9th
Cir. Feb. 28, 2001); Serv. Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 249 F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Lyons v. Philip Morris, Inc., 225 F.3d 909 (8th Cir.
2000); Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229 (2d
Cir. 1999); Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d
912 (3d Cir. 1999); E. States Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 729 N.Y.S.2d 240
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); Steamfitters Local Union No. 614 Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., No. W1999-0161-COA-R9-CV, 2000 WL 1390171 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26,
2000). But see Serv. Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 83
F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 1999) (allowing a labor union health trust fund's RICO contribu-
tion claim against Tobacco to survive defendant's motion to dismiss), rev'd, 249 F.3d 1068
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
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tortfeasors. 168 In contrast, the plaintiffs who brought the other RICO
third-party contribution suits against Tobacco were insurance and
health-fund entities that never faced liability for the underlying tort
giving rise to their alleged third-party harm. 16 9
Viewing the Trust and Tobacco as joint tortfeasors sheds light on
a policy consideration that may have fueled Judge Weinstein's analy-
sis. The Falise court's willingness to find sufficient proximate cause
may be due to the need for a system to apportion damages between
Tobacco and Asbestos. Judge Weinstein was keenly aware of the op-
portunity Falise presented to resolve the problem of liability appor-
tionment for harms attributable to both asbestos and tobacco.
Indeed, he stated that "[a] llowing recovery in this action by the Trust
would substantially clarify in a single action both Tobacco's share and
the Trust's share of liability for Claimants' injuries... 17
This statement raises a broader question: is Judge Weinstein's ap-
proach desirable or does it approach the problem widdershins? More
specifically, should the fact that a party bringing a contribution claim
is a joint tortfeasor seeking recovery from another alleged joint
tortfeasor shift policy toward allowing such a claim to proceed under
RICO notwithstanding the "remoteness," "derivative," or "indirect"'
171
nature of the injury? Or should the fact that Asbestos and Tobacco
are two of the largest and most notorious toxic tort litigants play a role
in a court's analysis? What special consideration should there be for
two large mass tort litigants whose products arguably cause identical
harms? Moreover, what are the implications of allowing such a contri-
bution claim to go forward? Lastly, to address these questions, we
must analyze the shortcomings of traditional contribution mecha-
nisms between joint tortfeasors as applied to the asbestos-tobacco rela-
tionship involving a harm attributable to both toxins.
1. Asbestos Defendants Assume Additional Liability for Lung Cancer
Attributable to Tobacco
Take the following hypothetical: an individual who was exposed
to asbestos began smoking before Congress mandated warnings for
tobacco products; subsequently, she developed lung cancer. 172 In the-
168 In rejecting the Tobacco defendants' double recovery argument, Judge Weinstein
noted that such an "argument fails because it neglects the relationship of the Tobacco
entities to the Trust: they are joint-tortfeasors." Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d
316, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
169 See, e.g., Sem. Employees, 249 F.3d at 1068; Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 229; Steamfit-
ters Local Union No. 420, 171 F.3d at 912.
170 Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 345.
171 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
172 Congress enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act in 1965. See
Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(2000)). Five years later, Congress amended the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
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ory, this individual could do any one of the following: (1) bring mis-
representation or failure-to-warn claims against Tobacco or Asbestos,
(2) bring these claims against both Tobacco and Asbestos, or (3)
bring only a defect claim sounding in strict products liability against
Asbestos.
In all likelihood, however, she will sue only the potential asbestos
defendants because litigating an asbestos claim is her most assured
option. 173 First, the causation hurdle is lower in asbestos litigation
because generally the only issue therein is product identification-
that is, whether the plaintiff had been exposed to a particular asbestos
product.1 74 Furthermore, proof of liability is more straightforward be-
cause an asbestos plaintiff also has the luxury of being able to sue in
strict liability on a product defect claim, as courts consider asbestos a
defective product. Under a strict liability regime, once a plaintiff
proves specific causation (that the plaintiff was exposed to a particular
defendant's product), the plaintiff recovers at least compensatory
damages.17 5
On the other hand, courts do not consider tobacco a defective
product' 76-such a conclusion would amount to categorical liability
for tobacco manufacturers. Therefore, in a tobacco action, plaintiffs
must resort to theories of conspiracy and misrepresentation on the
part of the tobacco industry to recover any damages. Unlike an asbes-
tos action, simply proving that the plaintiff was exposed to tobacco is
insufficient for recovery.
1969, which barred radio and television advertising by tobacco companies. See Pub. L. No.
91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87, 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2000)).
173 Plaintiffs' large-scale success in suing the asbestos industry since the 1970s has yet
to be replicated in tobacco litigation. For example, although plaintiffs in individual to-
bacco failure-to-warn cases have achieved a 33% success rate at trial, see florida Man Wins
$165,000 Verdict Against RlJ. Reynolds, ANDREWS ASBESTOS LITIG. REP., Jan. 3, 2002, at 7, 7
[hereinafter Florida Verdict Against RJR], this pales in comparison to the success rate in
asbestos litigation.
174 It is well settled that asbestos causes ailments such as certain cancers, mesothelioma
and asbestosis. See THOMAS E. WILLGING, TRENDS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION 9-10 (1987).
Richard Nagareda has noted that "[t]he existence of a link between asbestos and a host of
diseases is, by now, virtually indisputable as a general matter .. " Richard A. Nagareda,
Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 924 (1996).
This is not to say, however, that a defendant may not raise a state-of-the-art defense. See
PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, MASS TORT LITIGATION § 10:6 (1996). However, with respect to asbes-
tos manufacturer defendants, overwhelming proof of industry knowledge of the dangers
and suppression of such knowledge is now well settled. Cf WILLGING, supra, at 7 (noting
that "industry knowledge ... of the health dangers associated with exposure to asbestos
fibers illustrate some of the causes of the asbestos litigation explosion").
175 See WILLGING, supra note 174, at 9 (noting that since the decision in Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), "there has been little or no
dispute .. .that asbestos is an unreasonably dangerous product").
176 See Henderson & Twerksi, supra note 40.
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Secondly, asbestos litigation has matured much more than to-
bacco litigation.177 Notably, it was not until the early 1990s that plain-
tiffs prevailed at trial against Tobacco on individual personal injury
claims. In stark contrast, even during the nascent years of asbestos
litigation, one study demonstrated a plaintiff success rate at trial of
fifty-three percent between 1980 and 1982.178 Tobacco plaintiffs have
only recently reached a thirty-three percent success rate at trial.' 79
Arguably, the transaction costs of actually litigating asbestos
claims are also less, making that option even more appealing to plain-
tiffs. Additionally, many jurisdictions and judges have special dockets
and longstanding case management orders streamlining the litigation
of asbestos actions and problems of proof.'5 0 Conversely, the breadth
of individual tobacco cases has yet to reach a level at which courts
have developed an expertise in efficiency measures.
All these reasons suggest that a plaintiff would not likely bring
action simultaneously against Asbestos and Tobacco. A plaintiff
would be ill-advised to complicate her prima facie case against Asbes-
tos by introducing claims against Tobacco if the possibility of recover-
ing against Asbestos alone is more assured and would nevertheless
result in the same damages as if she had sued both. Indeed, bringing
the lone asbestos claim rather than the tobacco claim at all appears to
be a more prudent maneuver.
Given this obvious strategic choice, what are Asbestos's options if
a smoker stricken with lung cancer claims that asbestos exposure is
the cause of her illness? In theory, Asbestos may utilize numerous
procedural methods to apportion liability, such as impleading To-
bacco, bringing a separate contribution action against Tobacco, or de-
fending on the basis of plaintiff fault, arguing that the plaintiff's
tobacco use "caused" the harm. However, because of Tobacco's spe-
cial status and the nature of mass tort litigation, the first two options-
the contribution actions-are not viable means of relief for Asbes-
tos.""' Indeed, one can argue that Tobacco is an "immune nonparty"
in the context of asbestos personal-injury cases involving smokers. Ac-
cording to this line of reasoning, Tobacco is at least immune from
177 "The term 'mature' mass tort was coined by Francis McGovern to characterize re-
peat-injury litigation in which the sheer number of cases that had gone to trial established
the likely valuation of all subsequent claims." Samuel Issacharaoff, "Shocked": Mass Torts
and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1925, 1927 n.13
(2002) (citing Francis McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659,
659 (1989)).
178 See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND
EXPENSES 18-19 (1984).
179 See Florida Verdict Against RJR, sufra note 173, at 7.
18o See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 23-26 (1995).
181 See supra Parts 1.B.1-1.B.2.
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contribution claims brought by a tortfeasor whose product has also
been linked to lung cancer.
Moreover, traditional contribution mechanisms are economically
unfeasible for the mass toxic-tort defendant. Given the large number
of claims pending in every jurisdiction, 82 Asbestos's incentive to settle
outweighs its incentive to take a claim to trial. In fact, trial is a rare
occurrence with asbestos claims. One empirical study of the disposi-
tion of asbestos cases in ten federal districts revealed that only five
percent of all asbestos cases went to trial, or that they were disposed of
on pretrial motions. 18 3 In turn, settlement essentially nullifies any po-
tential contribution claim an asbestos defendant might have had
against an alleged joint tortfeasor. 184
Even the last option-that of arguing a plaintiff's contributory
fault for smoking-proves troublesome for Asbestos. In the majority
ofjurisdictions, only a showing that asbestos "substantially caused" the
harm is necessary.' 85 Therefore, once a plaintiff proves above a fifty
percent likelihood that asbestos was the cause of his or her lung can-
cer, the asbestos defendants become fully liable regardless of any "en-
hanced" injury that tobacco use might have caused.'8 6 Thus, the
asbestos defendant is left with only one method of recourse: seeking
contribution in a separate action. For the aforementioned reasons,
even this option is hardly viable.' 1 7
Although lawmakers founded contribution actions and appor-
tionment on theories of equity, 8" asbestos defendants find that they
cannot avail themselves of the equities these mechanisms purportedly
afford. Surprisingly, this is so even in cases in which the asbestos de-
182 STEPHENJ. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVILJuSTIcE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION
COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT 51 (2002) (finding that "through the year
2000 over 600,000 claimants had filed against about 6,000 defendants").
183 See WILLGING, supra note 174, at 26.
184 Under UCATA and most state contribution statutes, a settling party may not re-
cover from a non-settling party for any amount paid above its portion of liability. See supra
notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
185 See WEINSTEIN, supra note 180, at 151.
186 See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16 (1998)
(discussing "enhanced injury" liability).
187 See supra Part I.B.2.
188 SeeJean Macchiaroli Eggen, Understanding State Contribution Laws and Their Effect on
the Settlement of Mass Tort Actions, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1704 (1995) (noting that "[t]he
right of contribution evolved in equity" and the revisions of joint and several liability
"demonstrate a trend toward assuring that a defendant will be responsible for damages in
an amount that most closely approximates its proportionate equitable share of liability" (emphasis
added)); see also Michael D. Green, The Unanticipated Ripples of Comparative Negligence: Super-
seding Cause in Products Liability and Beyond, 53 S.C. L. REv. 1103, 1119 (2002) ("Compara-
tive fault and comparative contribution recognize the reality that many tortious acts may
concur to cause the same harm. While recognizing that reality, comparative methodology
also provides a mechanism for apportioning liability for the harm among all of the
tortfeasors in some rough approximation to the culpability of each.").
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fendants are armed with evidence demonstrating the "synergy" be-
tween tobacco and asbestos. Because of the strategic preference of
smoker-asbestos workers to sue Asbestos rather than Tobacco and the
lack of mechanisms available to a mass toxic-tort litigant such as Asbes-
tos to recover contribution, the Trust in Falise is correct in opining
that it has been unfairly bearing a portion of Tobacco's liability for
quite some time.18s
2. Why a Contribution Mechanism Is Necessary
As expressed above, because plaintiffs affirmatively choose to sue
Asbestos rather than Tobacco for a harm that is arguably attributable
to both toxins, and because courts are reluctant to allow juries to ap-
portion harm between the two, Asbestos bears a disproportionate
share of liability. This results in inequities that are contrary to the
progressive principles of fairness inherent in modern comparative
negligence and contribution statutes.' 1° However, beyond the ineq-
uity problems, there are policy issues to consider. The disparate treat-
ment of Asbestos leads to troubling extra-legal effects, such as the
current flood of bankruptcies among asbestos defendants,"" the in-
creased transaction costs, and the siphoning of available funds for fu-
ture plaintiffs.
The alarming increase of bankruptcies, including bankruptcies of
seemingly peripheral asbestos defendants, 9 2 correlates directly to in-
creased transaction costs. In fact, if mechanisms were available to
properly apportion the liability between Asbestos and Tobacco, the
former would not bear the disproportionate liability and thus could
avoid the need for bankruptcy protection. Bankrupt asbestos defend-
ants increase transaction costs by creating secondary litigation in the
bankruptcy courts.
Increased transaction costs due to the lack of contribution mech-
anisms are apparent in other ways. For instance, consider once again
the hypothetical smoker-asbestos plaintiff whose injury is lung cancer.
Suppose that such a plaintiff, because of product identification diffi-
culties, brings action against Tobacco rather than suing Asbestos. Al-
though it has already been shown that Asbestos may utilize a
contributory negligence defense based on the plaintiffs tobacco use
as the cause of injury, 19 : Tobacco's defense in the tobacco action will
189 See Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
190 See Part II.B.1.
191 See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
192 See CARROLL, supra note 182; Miel, supra note 9 (discussing the bankruptcy of Fed-
eral-Mogul, an automotive parts supplier that did not handle asbestos directly but, through
the acquisition of a subsidiary, became implicated in asbestos litigation).
193 See cases cited supra notes 23, 25-27, 29, 31.
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be to blame asbestos exposure as the cause of the injury. 19 4 Thus, as a
practical matter, the issue of liability as between Asbestos and Tobacco
is repeatedly litigated at the trial level. Such redundant litigation un-
doubtedly slows down the trial process, thereby increasing transaction
costs. Indeed, Judge Weinstein's suggestion in Falise that the Trust's
RICO action would "substantially clarify in a single action both To-
bacco's share and the Trust's share of liability"' 95 does have merit.
Establishing the relative liability as between Asbestos and Tobacco in
one action under the synergy theory would undoubtedly diminish
transaction costs resulting from repeatedly litigating this issue
separately.
Probably the most troubling extra-legal effect stemming from the
lack of viable contribution mechanisms available to Asbestos is the re-
ality of rapidly disappearing funds available to future plaintiffs. Judge
Weinstein noted this disturbing trend of bankruptcies among asbes-
tos-related companies in his book, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litiga-
tion.196 In a passage discussing the pitfalls of adjudicating mass toxic-
tort claims one by one, he argued:
If we persist in trying cases on an individual or even small-scale juris-
diction-by-jurisdiction basis, many plaintiffs will die before they are
compensated, a great many will wait years, and some may receive
nothing as the available monies are dribbled away by earlier awards
and transaction costs.' 97
Although in this passage Judge Weinstein is specifically advocating the
consolidation of mass toxic-tort actions, the underlying theme is that
inefficiencies result in insufficient funds to resolve all claims. Moreo-
ver, as the increasing number of bankruptcies illustrates, and the
above quote intimates, funds are actually dwindling at an expedited
rate.' 98 Ironically, the very fact that Asbestos brought a claim such as
the one in Falise not only indicates the dire situation, but the suit itself
also raises transactional costs and provides another example of a cost-
increasing, peripheral action.
Taken together, the combined effects of the lack of adequate
contribution devices available to Asbestos-the disproportionate as-
sumption of liability and the inequities flowing therefrom, increased
transaction costs, and dwindling funds-necessitate pro-activity to find
194 See San Francisco Jury Spares Asbestos Defendant in Big Tobacco Case, ANDREWS ASBESTOS
LITIG. REP., Apr. 14, 2000, at 6, 6 (highlighting the case in which Tobacco defended on
grounds that asbestos exposure caused the plaintiff's lung cancer).
195 Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 345 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
196 WEINSTEIN, supra note 180, at 136-37.
197 Id. at 141.
198 See CARROLL, supra note 182; Miel, supra note 9 (citing Credit Suisse First Boston's
estimate that liability claims from asbestos exposure could reach as high as $50 billion total
for a group of 120 defendants).
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a solution. This is especially true because asbestos defendants are
armed with substantial evidence demonstrating the synergistic rela-
tionship between tobacco use and asbestos exposure. 199 Furthermore,
although this Note has focused on the narrow situation concerning
Asbestos and Tobacco, the development of remedies to address ade-
quate contribution devices for Asbestos would prove relevant to other
mass-tort litigants.200 One can imagine other future mass toxic-tort
defendants in a similar predicament; namely, a situation in which, due
to a lag in scientific knowledge, the defendant learns either post-settle-
ment or post-litigation that another toxin may have caused the harm
for which the litigant was found liable.
The next section concludes that the RICO solution illustrated in
Falise is a viable and innovative response to the mass toxic-tort liti-
gant's contribution predicament.
3. The Use of Civil RICO as an Innovative Alternative in Falise
In light of the considerations discussed above,20 1 other courts
should follow Falise's lead and reinvigorate the traditional common-
law notions of proximate cause to allow such claims to proceed. A
RICO action affords a viable vehicle to resolve the apportionment of
liability between Asbestos and Tobacco because: (1) notwithstanding
the seemingly narrow articulation of proximate cause under RICO,
proximate cause is a malleable principle subject to judicial discretion;
(2) even under RICO's conceptualization of proximate cause, Asbes-
tos represents an appropriate party to vindicate the RICO claim; (3)
because of the singular nature of a RICO suit, the parties can litigate
liability between Tobacco and Asbestos in one action, thereby reduc-
ing transaction costs; and (4) the RICO action affords the only contri-
bution relief currently available to Asbestos.
First, the Asbestos-Tobacco complexity justifies doing "what jus-
tice demands" and returning to traditional articulations of proximate
cause. That notion asserts that proximate legal cause is a discretion-
ary doctrine. Even the court in Laborers Local 17 noted that proximate
cause is "an elusive concept, one 'always to be determined on the facts
of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, jus-
199 See supra Part I.B.
200 Other possible mass toxic-tort litigants include Lead Paint, Albuterol, and Bendec-
tin. See generally RHEINGOLD, supra note 174, § 3:13-3:43 (discussing class action case
histories).
201 See supra Part III.A.4-B.2 (observing the inequities of not allowing apportionment
between two tortfeasors, despite substantial evidence that warrants apportionment, and the
resulting increase in transactional costs and detrimental extra-legal effects of dispropor-
tionate liability).
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tice, policy and precedent.' "202 Furthermore, "[a] t bottom... proxi-
mate cause reflects 'ideas of what justice demands ... ' ,"'203 These
articulations imply the inherently flexible nature of proximate cause,
under which principles of justice and policy factor into a court's
calculus of whether a claimant's injuries, are too remote. Whether
one follows the Harper and James articulation of proximate cause
(the unforeseeable risk of harm conceptualization) 20 4 or that of Pros-
ser and Keeton (that proximate cause is a question of policy),205 both
articulations indicate the discretionary nature of a doctrine under-
pinned by notions of public policy. 20 6 Indeed, proximate cause analy-
sis considers "whether... the law will extend... responsibility to the
consequences which have in fact occurred."20 7 To make such a deter-
mination, courts invariably weigh a number of factors. 20 8 In short, the
unique facts of Falise, and the overwhelming policy considerations to
which it gives rise, 209 will compel courts to invoke their equitable dis-
cretionary powers and find adequate proximate cause.
Second, contrary to the holdings in RICO actions that involved
the Funds,210 the Falise plaintiffs represent an appropriate party to vin-
dicate the claims of the more directly injured parties. A risk that the
Holmes-RICO-proximate-cause-limitation attempts to address is the
existence of more "directly injured parties who can remedy the [al-
leged] harm."211 Yet, it is clear that the more "directly injured parties"
in Falise--the smoker-plaintiffs exposed to asbestos-do not have any
legal right to bring individual claims under RICO "because under the
statute, personal injuries are not recoverable. '" 212 Therefore, the argu-
ment that Asbestos lacks standing, or is too remote a party to vindicate
the RICO claim against Tobacco, falls apart because the directly in-
jured smokers and Trust claimants are themselves precluded from
bringing such a claim.
202 Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 235
(2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra
note 115, at 279).
203 Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (quoting PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 115, at 264).
204 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 167-69 (2d ed. 1986).
205 PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 115, at 273.
206 See supra Part IV.A.1, A.3.
207 PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS, supra note 115, at 273.
208 See supra Part III.A.1.
209 See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the consequences of the lack of contribution de-
vices available to asbestos defendants).
210 See, e.g., Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d
229, 229 (2d. Cir. 1999).
211 Id. at 237; see also supra note 59 (summarizing the Holmes proximate cause
standard).
212 Mosesso, supra note 61, at 338 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
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Third, the use of a RICO action provides an efficient means of
settling apportionment issues. Both an extension of the statute of lim-
itations on a contribution claim2 1 3 for mass toxic-tort litigants, as well
as a legislative amendment to Tobacco's legal immunity,214 appear to
resolve the inequity of disproportionate liability Asbestos has suffered.
The retooling of conventional contribution mechanisms would pro-
vide Asbestos adequate relief to vindicate its contribution claim under
the synergy theory of liability. 215 Such solutions, however, fail to ad-
dress the underlying dilemma of overburdensome transactional costs
because the issue of apportionment between Tobacco and Asbestos
would still be relitigated on a case-by-case basis. Conversely, as Judge
Weinstein suggested, a RICO action could be used to settle the appor-
tionment issue in a single suit, thereby cutting transaction costs and
ultimately "providing greater relief to more victims ... [than would] ad
hoc litigation" in which "[el normous sums would be consumed in liti-
gation costs that would otherwise be available for recovery" by the in-
jured smoker-asbestos plaintiffs. 2' 6
The argument against the use of RICO as a belated contribution
claim is that it allows Asbestos to sidestep the conventional limitations
of contribution actions 217 and legislatively enacted immunity stat-
utes.218 That such sidestepping is necessary rebuts this counterargu-
ment. The troubling state of asbestos litigation, and more generally,
the unique characteristics of the mass toxic-tort litigant, warrant a
fresh and innovative use of existing causes of action, such as civil
RICO, to reach equity-driven results. To quote Judge Weinstein:
Monstrous mega-mass tort litigations can be tamed. They must be
examined with a realistic eye, rather than romantic notions of how
the law and lawyers once operated when a tort involved only a pri-
vate matter of two parties ... and a passive court. Ethical and legal
213 In general, the statute of limitations to bring a contribution claim is one to two
years in most jurisdictions. See AMERICAN LAw OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 35,
§ 52:137, WL ALPL 52:137 (last updated Feb. 2003). Extending the statute of limitations
would be especially helpful to the mass toxic-tort litigant in light of the slow progress of
scientific knowledge, as the Falise facts illustrate. Indeed, knowledge of synergy between
toxins, as the asbestos defendants showed in Falise, did not develop until long after the
statute of limitations had tolled, thereby precluding contribution recovery.
214 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (detailing the California immunity
statute for tobacco defendants).
215 See supra Part I.B.1-B.2 (addressing the barriers to conventional contribution de-
vices that limit Asbestos's chances of contribution relief).
216 Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 346 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
217 See supra Part I.B.1-B.2 (discussing conventional contribution action
requirements).
218 See supra notes 32-34 (detailing the California immunity statute for tobacco de-
fendants); see generally Vandall, supra note 45 (explaining the proposed settlement between
Tobacco and the states that offered exemption from future class action suits as a part of
settlement).
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norms out of touch with real life lead not to morality, but to hypoc-
risy, abuse, and waste.2 19
As the above quotation intimates, passivity with regard to the reality of
the mass-tort situation leads to detrimental inefficiencies and waste.
The use of RICO as a contribution mechanism avoids such waste and
reduces the viscosity inherent in current conventional responses to
apportionment issues in an increasingly mass-tort world.
CONCLUSION
Without a resolution of the Asbestos-Tobacco apportionment
problem concerning injuries resulting from exposures to both toxins,
the problems of increased transaction costs and the resulting extra-
legal effects of bankruptcy and insufficient funds to pay claimants will
persist. Likewise, a party bearing a greater or lesser portion of its lia-
bility to the benefit or detriment of another party undermines the
fundamental premise of modern day comparative negligence and
contribution theories. Although unorthodox by strict civil RICO stan-
dards, the Falise rationale is an example of warranted judicial activism
and the appropriate use of a court's equitable powers to address a
complex legal quagmire.
219 WEINSTEIN, supra note 180, at 171.
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